Lessons from the income maintenance experiments: an overview by Alicia H. Munnell




The United States public welfare system has been a source of discon-
tent for many years. The system has been characterized as one that dis-
courages work, undermines the family, and perpetuates dependence. In
the late 1960s and early 1970s, many experts believed that the negative
income tax represented a simple and desirable alternative to the existing
programs. The complex set of cash and in-kind benefits paid to certain
categories of the poor would be replaced with a single guaranteed in-
come payment for all poor families that would gradually diminish as
earnings increased.
Congress, however, was extremely reluctant to enact such a plan.
One reason for the political opposition was the widespread fear that a
guaranteed income would reduce the work effort of poor breadwinners
and, as a result, cost taxpayers a great deal of money. In an effort to gain
some knowledge about the potential impact of a guaranteed income on
labor force activity, the federal government in the late 1960s and 1970s
sponsored four large-scale social experiments to measure individuals’
responses to different levels of benefits and tax rates. Although the
negative income tax itself has fallen from favor, the labor supply ques-
tion and the other basic issues studied in these experiments are still rele-
vant to the current social welfare debates. Architects of new programs
need to know the effects of particular reforms on work effort, family
stability, housing, food consumption and the well-being of dependent
children.
The negative income tax was tested in four separate experiments.
The first experiment, in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, lasted from 1968
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until 1972 and had a sample size of 1,357 households, consisting of low-
income couples from declining urban areas. The rural experiment,
which was conducted in Iowa and North Carolina from 1969 to 1973, in-
cluded 809 low-income rural families. The third experiment, which took
place in Gary, Indiana between 1971 and 1974, was composed of 1,780
black households, 59 percent of which were headed by single females.
The largest experiment, which contained 4,800 families, was conducted
in Seattle and Denver from 1971 to 1982. The Seattle-Denver experiment
not only offered recipients more generous plans than the other experi-
ments, but also extended the duration from three to five years for a
quarter of the participants.
Although the last of the four experiments ended in 1982, the major
lessons of the experiments are neither widely known nor well under-
stood. Indeed, the final reports from the two largest and most important
experiments--those in Gary, Indiana and in Seattle and Denver--have
never been published in a broadly accessible form. The experiments also
represent a landmark in the history of social policy. The New Jersey ex-
periment was the first large-scale attempt to test a policy initiative by
randomly assigning individuals to alternative programs, and random
assignment of participants to treatment and to control groups was an
important feature of all four experiments. The procedure reduces the
possibility of bias toward the tested plan on the part of sponsors and
researchers.. Although some of the results of the experiments are not
conclusive and are the subject of vigorous debate among specialists, the
experience gained from the undertaking offers valuable lessons for
future policy research projects. Both to summarize the findings and to
derive the methodological and policy lessons, the Federal Reserve Bank
of Boston and The Brookings Institution jointly sponsored, in the fall of
1986, a conference on "Lessons from the Income Maintenance Experi-
ments," the results of which are published in this volume.
The first set of three papers reexamines the empirical findings on
labor supply response, family stability and a host of other factors, such
as consumption, investment, and child well-being. While most of the
reworking of the data yields results similar to those previously pub-
lished, no consistent and reliable support is found for the earlier indica-
tions of large increases in the family breakup rate for those eligible for
guaranteed income payments in the Seattle-Denver experiment. This
new result is very important, since the threat of family dissolution is fre-
quently used as an argument against guaranteed income payments.
The empirical papers are followed by a critical assessment of the
methodology of the social experiments and the credibility of the main
findings. The experiments are then placed in historical context to ex-
amine why and how they came into existence and their contribution to
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lessons from the experiments as viewed from the perspectives of a
sociologist, a political scientist, an economist, and a public adminis-
trator. A concluding paper summarizes the implications of these lessons
for future efforts to reform the welfare system.
What Do the Experiments Tell Us?
Data from the four negative income tax experiments were used to
analyze the effects of various combinations of guaranteed payments and
tax rates on labor supply, family stability and a host of peripheral issues.
The following papers show that the results for labor supply responses
are quite robust across sites, populations, and treatments, whereas the
widely publicized conclusions on marital stability fail to hold up under
closer scrutiny. Although the experiments were not designed to yield
high-quality data on consumption patterns and other factors, the sug-
gestive results for these peripheral effects provide useful insights.
Labor Supply
Gary Burtless reported two different types of labor supply
estimates. The first was the simple difference between the work effort of
people who were assigned to the experimental programs and those who
were assigned to the control groups. Generally, the experiments caused
moderate reductions in work effort. The responses were greater among
women (an average reduction of 17 percent) than among men (7 per-
cent). The largest absolute reductions occurred in the Seattle-Denver
experiment, which offered the most generous plans. These work effort
responses were overstated to the extent that participants underreported
their earnings in order to receive larger benefits, but understated to the
extent that a limited duration experiment elicits a smaller response than
would be expected from an equivalent permanent program. This was
particularly the case for plans with high guaranteed incomes and low tax
rates.
Because estimates of average responses in specific experiments are
difficult to use for predicting the consequences of alternative national
reform proposals, Burtless also reported structural estimates of
response. Weighted averages of income and substitution elasticities
from the four experiments imply a much smaller responsiveness to
guaranteed income disincentives than do most nonexperimental esti-
mates, and they also fall in a far narrower range.
Burtless concluded by presenting the results of microsimulations
using elasticity estimates from the Seattle-Denver experiment to
calculate work effort response and budgetary costs for the nation as aAlicia H. Munnell
whole under alternative negative income tax plans. The results highlight
a conflict between the goal of providing work incentives to transfer
recipients and that of providing incentives to the population as a whole.
Recipients can be encouraged to work by reducing the tax rate applied to
benefits as earnings rise, but such a reduction will increase the number
of benefit recipients and hence reduce aggregate work incentiges. In
terms of budgetary implications, a plan that offers guarantees equal to
the poverty line with a moderate tax rate would cost roughly $60 billion
more than current welfare and food stamp programs; this figure falls to
roughly $20 billion with a higher tax rate.
While it appears that poverty could be eliminated at relatively
modest cost under the less ambitious plan, the labor supply responses
indicate that earnings reductions would offset at least part of the income
gains to the poor produced by the plan. As much as 40 to 58 percent of
the added transfers for two-parent families would be offset by earnings
reductions on the part of husbands and wives. The problem is less
severe in the case of single mothers, where earnings would fall by only
16 to 20 percent of additional costs.
In short, the four income maintenance experiments showed that
guaranteed incomes reduced work effort. The reductions were probably
larger than advocates had hoped, but considerably smaller and more
precisely measured than predictions based on prior nonexperimental
research. Even though the overall work reduction is small, the resulting
earnings loss among recipient breadwinners would represent a large
fraction of the payments to low-income families. This is a significant
political impediment to trying to reduce poverty through a system of
pure cash transfers.
Burtless’s formal discussants raised some serious concerns about his
assessment of the labor supply responses. Orley Ashenfelter’s first
point pertained to Burtless’s conclusion that a reduction in work effort
due to underreporting is just as costly to taxpayers as a genuine reduc-
tion in work effort. Ashenfelter contended that an equally plausible con-
clusion is that a real nationwide negative income tax would operate
using government reports on income and therefore would involve little
cost from underreporting. The real problem in his view was that the
experiments were not designed to address the possibility of under-
reporting, so it is impossible to tell from the data whether a genuine
scheme would produce a labor supply response, further underreport-
ing, or neither.
Ashenfelter’s second point related to estimating the magnitudes of
the income and the substitution effects; the experiments provided no
direct information on the question of whether higher tax rates led to
greater labor supply response or whether more generous payments in-
duced a larger reduction in work effort. Instead, the values for the incomeAN OVERVIEW
and substitution effects were delivered from models that Ashenfelter
feared primarily reflected the prior beliefs of the investigators.
Robert Hall made three points. First, in those cases where nonexper-
imental data from the unemployment insurance system confirm
substantial underreporting, the labor supply responses should be
studied directly using those data. Second, the smaller substitution and
income effects in the experimental studies tend to confirm that the
results of nonexperimental studies are tainted by the high correlation
between wages and preferences for working. Finally, Hall criticized
Burtless’s evaluation of negative income tax programs in terms of the
ratio of earnings reductions to program "costs."
Family Stability
Glen Cain reexamined the evidence from the experiments on the
issue of family stability. He concentrated on a 1983 study conducted by
Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma, which had produced the startling
finding that the negative income tax dramatically increased marital
dissolutions.
In theory, according to Cain, a negative income tax that was equally
as generous as the existing welfare program--namely, aid to families
with dependent children (AFDC)--would be expected to promote
marital stability. The negative income tax would provide the same
benefit as AFDC to a separated or divorced mother and more than
AFDC to a married woman and her husband, so that it would reduce the
price subsidy to divorce. Moreover, because the negative income tax
provides benefits to intact families, while AFDC frequently does not, it
produces higher family incomes, which are presumed to have a positive
impact on marital stability. A negative income tax that is less generous
than the AFDC program still reduces the price subsidy to divorce and
has a pro-stability income effect, albeit smaller. In the case of a negative
income tax plan that is more generous than the existing AFDC program,
the predicted effects are ambiguous. The pure income effect promotes
marital stability, while the net price effect would probably encourage
divorce. (Although the payment for both the divorced woman and for
the woman and her husband would be higher under the more generous
plan than under AFDC, the higher level of payments to the woman is
presumed to dominate the comparisons in her decision to remain
married or to become divorced.)
Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma found that the negative income tax
plans tested in the Seattle-Denver experiment increased the rate at
which marriages dissolved among white and black couples by 40 to 60
percent. One explanation for these results could have been that the
relative generosity of the payments in the Seattle-Denver experimentAlicia H. Munnell
produced negative price effects that dominated the positive income
effects. However, this apparently was not the case because the least
generous plans, which offered about the same payments as AFDC or
lower ones, induced the largest destabilizing effects, while the most
generous plans had no adverse impact on marital stability.
Using Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma’s model and data, Cain was
able to duplicate their dramatic results. He then made several modifica-
tions to the analysis: he eliminated couples without children (since they
would presumably be excluded from any program passed by Congress);
he separated the group who received only a negative income tax pay-
ment from those who received both the payment and training; and he
included information on marital dissolutions even if they occurred after
the couple left the experiment. The greatest difference between Cain’s
analysis and the earlier work, however, was that he included the full
five years of the five-year experiment, while Groeneveld, Hannan, and
Tuma emphasized results from the first three years.
With these modifications and timing differences, Cain found only
small and inconsistent effects on marital stability. In the case of white
and Hispanic couples, neither the benefits nor the training nor the inter-
action of the two had a statistically significant effect on the rate at which
marriages were dissolved. For blacks, on the other hand, the impact of
the combination of the negative income tax and the training program
was destabilizing and statistically significant. In terms of the impact of
the pure negative income tax plans (that is, payment without requiring
training) on all the groups, half the coefficients indicated a stabilizing
effect and half a destabilizing effect, with only one of the coefficients
statistically significant. Even when the site and duration samples were
aggregated, the only significant effect was the destabilizing impact of
the combined benefit and training program on blacks. This led Cain to
conclude that "the evidence [about the impact of the negative income
tax on marital stability] is not decisive or even persuasive.’" In any case,
Cain argued, short-duration experiments cannot be expected to yield
decisive results on demographic behavior, since they do not simulate
the incentives of a permanent negative income tax.
In response, Nancy Tuma, one of the authors of the original study,
argued that the evidence, while not decisive, was persuasive. Tuma
viewed Cain’s estimated increase in the marital breakup rate from the
pure negative income tax of 17 percent for whites and 31 percent for
blacks as large enough to be noteworthy. The lack of statistical signi-
ficance of the coefficients was to be expected, she argued, in view of the
small sample size.
Moreover, she questioned some of Cain’s analytical decisions that
reduced the negative income tax effects. For example, Tuma acknowl-
edged that the presence of children reduced the response to the negativeAN OVERVIEW 7
income tax, but argued that social scientists had a responsibility to
analyze all the data. Second, separating the pure negative income tax
from the combined benefit and training program reduces the sample
size so much that chance variations can swamp major trends. Finally,
Cain failed to mention the analysis of pooled data from the Seattle-
Denver and New Jersey experiments, which showed statistically signifi-
cant increases in the rate of marital breakup.
David Ellwood basically agreed with Cain that very little has been
learned from the negative income tax experiments about separation and
divorce. The evidence indicates that the programs probably were not
stabilizing and may have been somewhat destabilizing. This, however,
was to be expected given the generosity of negative income tax
payments relative to those provided under AFDC. The small sizes in the
Seattle-Denver experiment for groupings by race or site or treatment
preclude any definitive findings with nationwide application.
Other Effects
Eric Hanushek summarized the impact of negative income tax
payments on consumption and investment -- specifically, on housing
and education choices made by participants in the experiments. He
limited his review to these two areas because the experiments were not
designed to provide information on non-labor-supply responses and
these topics were ones where common findings could be generalized
from the four experiments.
A major motive for examining the consumption response is the
suspicion by some that the increased income would be spent on
frivolous or immoral products, such as fancy cars, color TVs or drugs.
On this score, the results should be very comforting to those concerned
that the money would be "squandered." Consumption rose modestly,
as would be expected with a slight rise in income, but the pattern of
expenditures remained unchanged from that which existed in the
absence of the payments.
One component of consumption where increases would have been
viewed as unambiguously good is housing, but the payments appear to
have had little effect on housing expenditures. Instead, the income
maintenance experiments (in conjunction with results from the housing
allowance experiments) demonstrated that, contrary to the commonly
held belief that the income elasticity of housing was approximately one,
the elasticities for the poor were quite low: a 10 percent increase in per-
manent income would lead to an increase in housing expenditures of 2
to 3 percent in the short run and 5 percent in the long run. Results from
the Gary and Seattle-Denver experiments did suggest that the income
maintenance programs encouraged homeownership, but this result,8 Alicia H. Munnell
given the temporary nature of the program, probably reflected a shift in
the timing of already planned house purchases.
The most likely place that income maintenance payments would
affect investment is the area of human capital, and, with regard to this,
analysts have focused on both school attendance and scholastic
performance. Although the evidence on scholastic peformance is mixed
and weak, the experiments do appear to have affected attendance. A
negative income tax would influence the school-attendance decision by
reducing the cost of not being in the labor force, and the data from the
experiments show that, for the experimental period, the programs did
appear to induce more schooling. In fact, the reduction in labor force ac-
tivity for young people brought about by the negative income tax is
almost completely offset by increased school attendance. Hence, the
encouragement of skill development may be one of the positive side
benefits from the introduction of a negative income tax.
Katharine Bradbury expanded on Hanushek’s paper by summariz-
ing the research relating to some other areas of consumption and invest-
ment, including health, and social and psychological well-being. She
emphasized that findings about how people spend additional income
are important not only because they provide some facts to help displace
old stereotypes, but also because they can assist policymakers who must
choose between cash assistance and targeted forms of aid. For example,
as far as the researchers could determine, medical care utilization did
not increase and health status did not improve as a result of the income
maintenance payments. Hence, to the extent that improved health is of
particular interest, programs aimed directly at health care have a better
chance of success than do cash transfers. In terms of psychological well-
being and participation in community life, again the researchers found
no effect. Overall, the results suggest that the lives of recipients were
not altered dramatically by the payments offered in the experiments.
Robert Michael reiterated the point that the experiments were ill-
suited to yield high-quality data on topics other than labor supply, but
argued, nevertheless, that important suggestive results should not be
overlooked in any review. For example, studies of the Seattle-Denver
experiments showed a substitution toward market forms of child care
from family care and other nonmarket forms. The Seattle-Denver ex-
periments also made it possible to study migration, since they permitted
recipients who moved to continue receiving benefits; the results showed
that the rate of migration was 50 percent higher for those in the ex-
perimental negative income tax plans than for the controls. Investigators
also looked at the effects of the experiments on fertility using the Seattle-
Denver data; in this case, the results were inconclusive since the effect
was negative for whites, positive for Hispanics, and not statistically
significant for blacks. Michael concluded, however, that while theAN OVERVIEW
peripheral results are interesting and provocative, the weakness of the
experimental data for investigating these issues has forced researchers
to look to alternative data sources for subsequent analysis.
In summary, the survey of empirical findings suggests that the in-
come maintenance experiments caused a moderate but manageable.
reduction in labor force activity, had no statistically significant stabiliz-
ing or destabilizing effect on the marriages of couples with children, and
basically did not alter noticeably the consumption and investment deci-
sions of recipients. The question that remains is: how much weight can
be placed on these results?
How Reliable Are the Results?
Arnold Zellner and Peter Rossi touched off a heated debate with
their sharp criticism of the goals, design, execution, and analysis of the
income maintenance experiments. In their opinion, inadequate atten-
tion was devoted to formulating clear-cut objectives. For example, to the
extent that the goal was to estimate the cost of alternative negative
income tax plans, the experiments were not really designed to provide
the appropriate information. Feasibility studies or pilot projects were
generally nonexistent. Serious measurement problems were not ade-
quately resolved. Design statisticians, survey experts, and other
specialists did not play an active enough role in the planning and execu-
tion of the experiments. Management and administration procedures
were not completely satisfactory, Policymakers and researchers did not
share clearly stated objectives. The experimental designs and the models
on which they were based were frequently inadequate. Finally, the
quality of reporting of results left much to be desired.
The authors made several suggestions for improving the method-
ology of future experiments. To provide useful predictions, such ex-
periments should employ a sufficiently large national probability sample
and test a wider range of treatments. (In the Seattle-Denver experiment,
for example, marginal tax rates varying only between 0.5 and 0.8 were
employed.) Second, if researchers are uncertain about which model to
use, experiments should be designed to provide information to
discriminate among the alternatives. Third, randomization should be
used, since it mitigates the effects of model misspecification and pro-
duces robust statistical designs. Fourth, in view of the considerable
uncertainty over how the models should be specified, it is important to
test the predictive ability of the models used in the experiments. For ex-
ample, the labor supply equations from the Seattle experiment could
have been used to predict labor response in Denver. Fifth, the results
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in terms of the probability that the estimates lie within a certain range.
Moreover, it is useful to note that if the outcomes for individual experi-
mental units are not independent, the precision of the estimates disap-
pears rapidly. Sixth, recognizing the dynamic aspects of economic
behavior leads one to construct models different from the static ones
used in the income maintenance experiments; the experiments are of
short duration while the policies are permanent and may therefore call
forth a different response. Finally, whenever it is feasible, social ex-
periments should be linked to ongoing longitudinal surveys.
Jerry Hausman, the first formal discussant, stressed the authors’
point that experiments should provide usable predictions of the effects
of various proposed policies and measures of predictive precision. This
consideration has two corollaries: First, the experiment should cover the
entire range of possible options so that policymakers do not have to ex-
trapolate results to untested plans. Second, the design of the experiment
must supply results that are sufficiently precise to be useful. Hausman’s
greatest disappointment with the results from the negative income tax
experiments was the lack of precision. In terms of reporting the results,
however, Hausman did not think it was necessary to adopt the Bayesian
approach, since he had found that point estimates and standard errors
were sufficient for most audiences. Finally, he supported the Zellner-
Rossi call for panel data, but noted that the necessity of keeping track of
panel members may raise the costs considerably. Overall, Hausman
agreed with the Zellner-Rossi conclusion that the goal, design, execu-
tion, and analysis of the income maintenance experiments left much to
be desired. He attributed the failings, however, to the fact that the Gary
and Seattle-Denver experiments were designed and executed before the
lessons of the New Jersey experiment were learned.
Charles Metcalf found Zellner and Rossi’s recommendations and
criticisms naive. For example, their call for interaction between sponsors
and bidders in preparing proposals reflects a simplistic view of the com-
petitive procurement process; often the design and execution phases of
an experiment are carried out by different organizations under separate
contracts. Moreover, a pilot project may not be needed in an environ-
ment cluttered with an extensive history of social experiments, especial-
ly since pilots may delay the experiment for a considerable period. Addi-
tionally, the Zellner-Rossi suggestion that a national sample is absolute-
ly necessary to make national cost estimates fails to recognize the trade-
off often required between the sample being from the relevant popula-
tion and the intervention tested being relevant in terms of program,
duration, and other features. The increasingly prevalent view is that
experiments work only if the intervention is carried out by "real" pro-
gram agencies rather than by experimenters, and this tends to limit the
number of jurisdictions that can be covered by an experiment. Finally,AN OVERVIEW
Metcalf noted that evidence is mounting that efforts to use longitudinal
panels as comparison group alternatives to randomized control groups
have been unsuccessful, and rejected Zellner and Rossi’s proposal that a
longitudinal panel could be used as the basis for drawing experimental
samples.
Metcalf also thought that Zellner and Rossi were unrealistic in some
of their criticisms. For example, they argued that the experiments
should have tested a broader range of plans, a suggestion with which
most experimenters would agree from a pure design perspective; but
the policymakers financing the experiments were reluctant to consider
"extreme" plans outside the "relevant policy range." Zellner and Rossi
characterized as "unusual" the use of the status quo rather than "no
treatment" as controls, the basis of comparison in social experiments;
however, removing the individuals who form the control group from
AFDC would be an extremely unrealistic definition of no treatment.
Moreover, one of the objectives of the study was to provide internally
valid direct estimates of the relative costs of AFDC and the negative
income tax. Finally, Metcalf argued that Zellner and Rossi’s effort to
discredit the nominal standard errors from the experiment by alluding to
cross-unit dependence was extremely misleading.
The discussion of the Zellner-Rossi paper was heated. Robert
Spiegelman called many of the authors’ direct and implied criticisms
"off base." He argued that the experiments did have a clearly defined
objective -- namely, to measure the labor supply response of the work-
ing poor to the receipt of negative income tax payments; the emphasis
on measuring the cost of national programs was really an afterthought.
Spiegelman contended that the design proved relatively efficient for the
original purpose; the variations in estimates across support levels and
tax rates provided good measures of income and substitution effects.
Second, in terms of the range of programs tested, it is important to note
that training programs were added in some cases to counteract some of
the adverse incentives. Third, the New Jersey experiment did serve as a
feasibility study for later experiments, particularly Seattle-Denver.
Fourth, the responses that the experiments were designed to measure
were estimated with a fairly high degree of accuracy; despite the dif-
ferences in sites, samples, and methodology, the labor supply response,
particularly for males, fell in a fairly tight range across the experiments.
Harold Watts thought that Zellner and Rossi showed considerable
naivete about how much time and money would be required to fulfill all
the requirements of their textbook paradigm. The experiments tried to
measure some basic behavioral responses and were quite successful in
this regard. The results dramatically narrowed the range of estimates of
the labor supply elasticities and this was a significant contribution to the
debate. This conclusion seemed to reflect the consensus of the assem-12 Alicia H. Munnell
bled group, albeit a somewhat biased sample since many had been in-
volved in the design and execution of the experiments.
The Experiments in a Policy Context
Dennis Coyle and Aaron Wildavsky discussed the role of the income
maintenance experiments in the gradual evolution of the negative in-
come tax from an academic notion to a legislative proposal. Their paper
focused specifically on the origins and ultimate defeat of President
Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan, and found that the preliminary results
from the New Jersey income maintenance experiment had little
influence on the final outcome. Instead, the authors attributed the
failure of welfare reform in 1969-70 to the inability of representatives of
different political cultures to achieve a compromise.
The negative income tax was endorsed in the 1960s by both liberals
and conservatives in the wake of widespread disillusionment with the
training and service programs of President Johnson’s Great Society.
When President Nixon came to office, he assembled a group of welfare
experts to put together a domestic reform package that would eliminate
poverty at a reasonable price. The result was the Family Assistance Plan,
which would have provided to every family in the United States a
minimum guaranteed annual income of $1600. The guaranteed income
would have been reduced by 50 cents for each dollar earned by recip-
ients until a break-even point of roughly $4000.
According to Coyle and Wildavsky, the specific design of the Family
Assistance Plan was an attempt to appeal to three political cultures. The
extension of benefits to millions of previously unprotected people
without the stigma generally associated with welfare payments would
please the "egalitarians," who support income redistribution. Limiting
the plan to families would gain the backing of "hierarchs," who believe
in the institution of the family and paternalistic social policies. Finally,
letting the poor control their own expenditures would please the "in-
dividualists," who are committed to the autonomy of the individual.
In Coyle and Wildavsky’s cultural notation, the public’s attitude
toward poverty at that time was a compound of hierarchy and individ-
ualism. Members of the public generally opposed a guaranteed income,
preferring instead to guarantee and even require work. If poverty is the
lack of money, the provision of money should end poverty. But if pover-
ty is the lack of a job, and the discipline and self-respect that go with it,
transferring money may only gloss over the poverty problem. It is better
to give the poor what is good for them--food and work--which will
enable them to be self-reliant and earn the individualist reward of the
right to spend their earnings as they please.AN OVERVIEW 13
The major view expressed in Congress about the Family Assistance
Plan was that of the egalitarians, who reflected the attitude of the
welfare establishment that the plan was essentially too little, too late.
They repeatedly proposed alternatives that would broaden the defini-
tion of "family" to include all individuals and greatly raise the
minimum income. Arguments that the Family Assistance Plan was a
major step toward a universal guaranteed income failed to impress these
liberal opponents. Eventually, the liberals united with conservatives,
who reflected the public’s belief that jobs, not money, held the answer
to the poverty problem, and defeated the proposal.
The income maintenance experiments, originally designed to
strengthen the case for a future negative income tax, became of
immediate policy relevance when Nixon proposed reform along the
lines of the New Jersey experiment. In response, officials of the Office of
Economic Opportunity produced preliminary findings that indicated
that work effort did not decline and may even have increased among
those receiving payments. Although these results ran counter to
economic theory, they were received enthusiastically by those support-
ing the bill. While later results showed that income guarantees reduced
hours of work, the initial findings were still cited repeatedly by sup-
porters of the negative income tax.
In any case, argued Coyle and Wildavsky, the experimental results
were hardly equal to the task of overcoming fundamental cultural
disagreements. In the end, the integrative solution embodied in the
Family Assistance Plan -- family support for hierarchs, extension of
benefits for egalitarians, and reduced bureaucracy and greater
autonomy for individualists -- failed because adherents of these cultures
refused to compromise. The egalitarians demanded a level of income
guarantee unacceptable to individualists, while the hierarchs wanted to
enforce values, especially a work requirement, that were unacceptable
to either of the other cultures.
Lawrence Mead, the first formal discussant, had some sympathy
with the auth6rs’ ideological approach, but attributed the failure of
welfare reform in 1969-70 primarily to the fact that the politicians were
out of step with public opinion. As repeated surveys indicate, the public
wants to guarantee all needy persons subsistence, but wants to make
the employable work for it. The reforming elites, however, were not
willing to enforce social obligations in return for benefits.
Hugh Heclo argued that elaborate "cultural" theories were not
necessary to explain the failure of welfare reform in 1969-70 and that the
authors had failed to expose the important sociopolitical aspects of the
income maintenance experiments. These experiments represented the
triumph of an analytic subgovernment; no politician in the White
House, no Congressman, no interest group as conventionally defined,14 Alicia H. Munnell
and no lobby of ordinary citizens was pressing for multi-million-dollar
social experiments. Their creation was the work of a more or less
autonomous economics profession, which reflected both the growing
prominence of economics and the relative collapse of its closest
disciplinary competitor on poverty issues -- social work/sociology. The
dominance of the economists, however, meant that the experiments
were very narrowly focused; Heclo characterized the exercise as
"spending millions of dollars on four experiments to see if people worked
less in response to income guarantees and next to nothing to find out
what they did with any lessened time on the job."
The legacy of the experiments, according to Heclo, is twofold. In one
sense, the experiments may have encouraged opponents of welfare
reform to focus on the one issue of work incentives. On the other hand,
the experiments broke ground for a whole succeeding generation of
social experimentation. The new experiments employ more refined
techniques and have closer connections to existing political and
administrative structures. The history of social experimentation over the
last 20 years must be admired as an attempt of a society to understand
itself.
Policy Lessons and Implications for the Future
Members of a panel of experts, each from a different discipline, sum-
marized their views about the policy lessons that resulted from the in-
come maintenance experiments.
A Sociologist’s Perspective
Lee Rainwater lamented that for all the money spent on the experi-
ments, remarkably little was learned about social, as opposed to
economic, behavior. He attributed this to three specific problems. The
first was a lack of perspective in the initial conception of the experi-
ments. The income maintenance experiments were designed only to test
the implications of a negative income tax, which was a highly specific
policy reflecting the particular circumstances of the time. Little thought
was given to how this policy might fit into the range of available options,
and almost no thought to how it might fit into the range of potential
overall welfare regimes. Such a perspective might have been gained by
looking at national policies in a comparative context; for example in
Europe, economic security has always been linked to employment for
working-age families.
Second, no effort was made in the experiments to penetrate the
black box of causation. Few basic descriptive data were collected onAN OVERVIEW 15
what people thought was going on and why they reacted as they did. To
do this would have challenged the basic tenets of modern social science,
where the emphasis is placed on elegant manipulation of numbers
rather than interpretation of narrative and qualitative information.
Third, because of the narrow focus of the study, the findings cannot
tell us whether the negative income tax is good or bad policy. For exam-
ple, an increase in the rate of marital separation and divorce (as initially
claimed) need not be an undesirable development if people were
dissolving destructive unions. Similarly, the reduction in work effort
may not have adverse implications for a society with high levels of
unemployment.
To Rainwater’s list, commenter Charles Murray added three other
reasons why the experiments failed to determine whether the negative
income tax was good policy. First, no minimum baseline income stan-
dard exists that will enable everyone to have a decent standard of living.
The conventional poverty index is meaningless, because it cannot
discriminate between living a low-income life in the inner city and in a
small town. A family at the poverty line might live decently in a civilized,
functioning community, such as a small town in Missouri or Colorado,
but be unable to survive on two or three times that amount in the South
Bronx. Second, no one has considered what happens after a negative in-
come tax is introduced nationwide and some people still have inade-
quate food and shelter; the merits of an income maintenance scheme
that supplants the curr~ent system are very different from one that sup-
plements it. Finally, the experiments were forced to focus on measurable
outcomes and therefore provide no insights on noneconomic rewards,
such as the psychic gains that people receive from earning their own
income.
A Political Scientist’s View
According to Richard Elmore, the experiments were designed to in-
fluence the political debate on income support in two ways. The first
was methodological -- to focus the debate on a few key empirical ques-
tions and estimate these effects more precisely than was possible with
nonexperimental data -- and the second was political -- to legitimize the
idea of a universal cash transfer program.
The main methodological lesson learned was that the very rigor of
social experimentation limits the policy relevance of the results. The
measured impact of the negative income tax on work effort would have
to be qualified in a variety of ways to reflect the limited number of plans
tested, the variability of results among different sites, misreporting of
income and work, bias caused by attrition, variation in benefit packages
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perimental results to a nationwide program. The alternative is to ignore
the methodological uncertainties and average the results across experi-
ments, but this approach undermines the methodological rationale for
doing the experiments in the first place.
To the extent that the experiments have been successful as an instru-
ment of political advocacy, their influence has been indirect. Although
variants of the negative income tax found their way into the presidential
or congressional arena five times, the published record shows that the
experimental results entered the policy debate explicitly only twice. The
first was the release of preliminary results from the New Jersey experi-
ment in 1970 (discussed by Coyle and Wildavsky); the second occurred
in 1978 when Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan announced in a speech
on the Senate floor that evidence of high rates of family dissolution
among recipients in the Seattle-Denver experiment had caused him to
question his earlier advocacy of a negative income tax. Neither of these
instances captured the intent of policy researchers when they undertook
the experiments. Moreover, the debate on the specific proposals focused
very little on the estimates produced by the experiments. Rather,
policymakers were more concerned with the incremental effects of
changes in the design of the plans and with the winners and losers.
On the other hand, the analytic subgovernment that grew up
around the experiments served as a place for stockpiling options, and
when the problem-identifying and decisionmaking streams occasionally
converged, these "option depots" supplied some of the raw material for
the policy debate. Hence, research influences policy not by marshalling
specific evidence in support of specific decisions, but rather by shaping
policymakers’ perceptions of the relevant policies and the feasible range
of options.
Robert Reischauer argued that Elmore underrated the role of the ex-
periments in legitimizing the negative income tax for policymakers; the
findings were discussed frequently at meetings between congressional
advocates of welfare reform and policy officials in the executive branch
and they influenced the design of President Carter’s welfare reform plan
in numerous ways. Where the experiments failed was in convincing the
American public that radical reform of the welfare system was necessary
and desirable.
In Reischauer’s opinion, failure was inevitable given that the
negative income tax was designed to address the deficiencies that the
policy elite saw in the current welfare system, not the shortcomings that
most concerned the general public. The public believed that welfare
costs were too high, that the caseload was expanding too rapidly, and
that people who were fully capable of work were freeloading. In this set-
ting, the experiments were bound to exacerbate the problem, because
they focused on the measurement of labor supply responses to the pro-AN OVERVIEW 17
posed welfare reform. The results confirmed that indolence would be
rewarded at the taxpayers’ expense and thereby reinforced the public’s
negative perception of welfare reform.
An Economist’s View
Robert Solow contended that social experimentation is bound to
produce weak results--the coefficients are rarely statistically significant
and the magnitudes of the responses are typically small. The nature of
the results reflects both the inherent variability in each individual’s
behavior and the variation among individuals in their average response,
which simply cannot be related to observed and observable character-
istics. Nevertheless, social experiments may be useful in showing that
policies selected on other criteria will not have dramatically destabilizing
effects.
For example, economists embraced the negative income tax in the
late 1960s because of the sense that the nation was finally in a position to
eliminate poverty, the belief that the hodgepodge of categorical pro-
grams was inefficient, and the conviction that rules governing AFDC
encourage family breakups. The one possible problem was that a decent
guaranteed income combined with high tax rates required to keep costs
under control would induce many recipients to withdraw from work.
The experiments were designed to address this issue and they did pro-
duce an answer; guaranteed payments do have a labor supply effect, as
economists predicted, but hardly large enough to jeopardize the
nation’s supply of work effort. Moreover, with continued high levels of
national unemployment, the return of these individuals to the labor
force probably would not have increased employment.
In Solow’s view, the experience with the negative income tax pro-
vides a general model for social experimentation. Society may want to
undertake certain policies for noneconomic reasons, but may be
hindered by the fear that doing the right thing could be unexpectedly
costly. A well-designed experiment can help determine the risks, and
the prevalence of weak results should not be a deterrent.
Edward Gramlich thought that conference participants had been
unduly critical of the experiments, pronouncing them a failure either
because the research was inconclusive or because interest in the policy
under investigation had waned. Disillusionment with the negative in-
come tax, in his view, had nothing to do with the experiments, but
rather reflected the need of taxpayers to be assured that responsibility
for supporting the poor would be shared by recipients themselves, in
the form of work requirements, child support enforcement, and other
provisions that would have sounded punitive in the early 1970so In
Gramlich’s opinion, the recognition of the need for responsibility shar-18 Alicia H. Munnell
ing will eventually produce substantial welfare reform. The work-
welfare experiments being carried out by the Manpower Demonstration
Research Corporation, which have benefited technically and ad-
ministratively from the negative income tax experiments, may have a
positive impact on the nature of the reform, because they incorporate
this element of responsibility sharing.
A Public Administrator’s View
Barbara Blum addressed two questions. The first was one of process:
What was the relationship between the way the income maintenance ex-
periments were conducted and their reception by welfare officials? The
second concerned substance: What lessons for administering today’s
welfare system were generated by the experiments?
Welfare administrators had little direct contact with the researchers
who were conducting the experiments. One reason for the lack of com-
munication was the difference in time perspectives of the two groups;
the administrators were forced daily to confront a variety of new and
pressing issues, while the researchers were engaged in an evaluation
that would take several years to produce results. The nature of the par-
ticular experiments also created a gulf between the two groups. Re-
searchers had little incentive to establish channels of communication
with welfare administrators, who most likely would have been dis-
placed if a negative income tax had been adopted. Hence, one problem
associated with studying sweeping reform proposals is the difficulty of
working closely with officials in the existing system to jointly identify
and implement changes suggested by the research results.
Although the major findings of the experiments had no direct im-
pact on the welfare system, some administrative procedures initiated by
the researchers did find their way into existing programs. First, the
researchers replaced the traditional procedure of infrequent face-to-face
interviews to reevaluate eligibility with reports filled out and mailed in
monthly by the recipients. Second, the researchers processed the
reported data automatically. Third, they introduced retrospective
budgeting so that benefits were based on the family’s circumstances in
the previous month, not on what it was anticipated they would need for
the next one. Most states now use monthly reporting and retrospective
budgeting, although some controversy exists about the effectiveness of
these reforms with respect to both cost and the welfare of recipients.
Blum thought that two other interesting administrative issues were
imbedded in the experiments. The first was the degree to which par-
ticipants were actually aware of the rules of the game, since surveys in-
dicated that only a fraction of beneficiaries understood how their
benefits were calculated. Although analysts argue that people are betterAN OVERVIEW 19
able to act in accordance with rules than to answer questions about
them, the comprehension issue suggests that policymakers may defeat
their purpose by making incentives so complex that rewards and
penalties are obscured.
The second issue was whether it is desirable to have a more imper-
sonal income maintenance system. For the many recipients who use
welfare as a temporary source of aid, a simplified impersonal system
would probably be highly desirable, and for this group it may be useful
to look again at what was learned from the negative income tax ex-
periments. But for chronic recipients, who consume a disproportionate
share of the welfare dollars, it is probably necessary to provide a coor-
dinated and sustained array of services in addition to benefit payments.
Wilbur Cohen did not consider the lack of contact between research-
ers and administrators a fatal flaw, since change is likely to be slow and
incremental, as in the adoption of the administrative innovations.
Future experimentation, however, should focus on modifying specific
aspects of the current system, such as introducing work and training
programs and determining the appropriate earnings disregard under
AFDC.
Lessons for the Future
Richard Nathan summarized the lessons from the income main-
tenance experiments for both social policy and future research. In his
opinion, the main effect on social policy was to educate government
officials, the media, and interested citizens on the issues associated with
the introduction of a negative income tax. The educational process was
expensive and also cast doubt on the idea as a solution to the nation’s
poverty problem. Giving money to people without requiring work,
however, was never a comfortable approach for most politicians, and for
this reason Nathan concluded that the negative income tax was an ill-
advised subject for social experimentation. Experiments should be
restricted to situations where the politicians are "(1) genuinely in-
terested in dealing with an issue; (2) uncertain about how to do so; and
(3) willing to consider the approach that is the subject of experimenta-
tion." The negative income tax did not satisfy these conditions.
In terms of policy research, the experiments demonstrated that it
was possible to conduct large-scale, rigorous, honest demonstration
projects with random assignment of participants to treatment and con-
trol groups. On the other hand, since social experiments are expensive
and take a long time to complete, researchers should attempt to learn
more from such endeavors than they did in the negative income tax
case. Nathan also argued that experiments of more selective service-type
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schemes. Not only are such policies more realistic politically, but the
results of such experiments are more easily applied to the nation as a
whole, whereas introducing a massive income transfer scheme might
change national behavior in unforeseeable ways.
In short, Nathan concluded that while the negative income tax
experiments were unwise, the idea of social experimentation with ran-
dom assignment, which they introduced, is good. "The negative in-
come tax experiments, as the first such effort of this type, led the way in
developing both the capacity and the sensitivity necessary to the more
effective use of social experimentation as an input to the government
process."
Conclusions
In terms of an overall assessment of the income maintenance experi-
ments, the conference participants fell into two groups. One argued that
the effort absorbed an inordinate amount of the available research funds
and diverted professionals from other, more worthy endeavors. The
other contended that the experiments were a useful device that not only
improved the existing estimates of labor supply responses but also in-
creased our capacity to carry out social science research.
The debate over whether the experiments were worthwhile in view
of the opportunities forgone will never be resolved, but almost all ex-
perts agree that two important results emerged. First, the experiments
refined the estimates of individuals’ responses to net wage rates,
measured by using variations in taxes, and to unearned income,
demonstrated by using variations in guaranteed income. The results of
the income maintenance experiments are valuable not only for
evaluating the effects of welfare reforms, but also for estimating the ef-
fects of changes in other programs, such as expanding the earned
income tax credit in the personal income tax. Moreover, even though
attention has now turned to programs that will require work for welfare
benefits, the estimates are useful to show the parameters that the
administrators are pushing against.
The second lesson from the experiments, namely the merits of
random assignment, is even more important if Congress endorses the
Administration’s proposal toembark on a series of state experiments in
welfare reform. If these experiments are to help in improving the
welfare system, they must assign participants randomly to control and
treatment groups. Only this approach avoids self-selection bias, a
phenomenon for which no statistical method can compensate. Nowhere
are the difficulties of evaluating programs without random assignment
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claimed for the state’s Employment and Training (ET) Choices program,
but the lack of a control group makes it impossible to separate the effects
of the training program frorfi the impact of an economy operating with
very low levels of unemployment.
Recent social experimentation has demonstrated its ability to pro-
duce timely results at a reasonable cost. It would be criminal for the
states to spend the next decade experimenting with a host of alternative
approaches to welfare reform without providing the bases for evaluating
them.